

CIACO NID 81 [REDACTED]

December 19, 1981

SPECIAL ANALYSIS

USSR-POLAND: Martial Law and Soviet Contingency Plans

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A reliable source has reported that by late October the Polish authorities had made their decision to impose martial law and had coordinated their plan with the Soviets, who had pressed for the crackdown. The meeting of Solidarity's National Commission in Gdansk on 11-12 December and the regime's belief that public opinion had been shifting away from Solidarity apparently provided the opportunity for the government's action. [REDACTED]

Success to Date

Polish operations until now have proceeded according to the plan. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

The Soviet leadership, however, may be more skeptical in view of the reports of increased resistance in Poland as well as the toughening international reaction. [REDACTED]

Should the Polish military succeed in establishing order and calming public reaction, Premier Jaruzelski is expected to offer a general amnesty and take other public relations measures designed to suggest a return to normalcy in Poland. The authorities may also seek to establish a "workers' Solidarity," which would cooperate with the regime in much the same way as the current "official" trade unions. Presumably, this would be done to symbolize the leadership's continued commitment to reform. One of Jaruzelski's advisers told [REDACTED] that

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some form of worker participation in enterprise management also will be introduced in the hopes of stimulating productivity. [REDACTED]

Even if martial law is imposed successfully, the Soviets may find themselves at odds with Jaruzelski over the nature of the political and economic regime to be established in its aftermath. Many Polish military leaders reportedly were initially sympathetic to the nationalistic aspects of the Solidarity movement. Jaruzelski may attempt to retain at least some of the reforms of the past 16 months and seek to minimize Soviet influence. The Council of National Salvation, however, includes several officers who reportedly are more pro-Soviet and antireform than Jaruzelski and his supporters. The Soviets probably will seek to use this pro-Soviet faction to manipulate the structure and policies of the Polish regime. [REDACTED]

Soviet Contingency Plans

Should Polish authorities ask for Soviet assistance, the source reports that the Soviets have plans to intervene quickly with a force of about 15 divisions, including the two Soviet divisions stationed in Poland and some East European forces. According to the source, the regiments of these two divisions have been augmented with additional combat units, effectively more than doubling the strength of the Soviet presence in Poland, but we do not believe that significant additional forces have been moved to Poland. [REDACTED]

If the Soviet divisions to be used for the intervention came from those stationed in Eastern Europe, it would take little time to prepare and ready them for a move into Poland because they are maintained at a high level of preparedness. In the more likely event that a number of the Soviet divisions were drawn from the western USSR, they would require preparations that would take at least a few days. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] If they expected to contend with a hostile Polish military, the Soviets probably would require a force considerably larger than the 15 divisions; such a force would require more preparation time. [REDACTED]